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Key points
1. The Chechen issue, which remains unresolved
since the break-up of the Soviet Union, is one of
the most difficult problems of todayÕs Russia.
Since 1991, the Chechen conflict has passed
through four phases: the ÒChechen revolutionÓ
and Dzhokhar DudaevÕs rule (1991Ð1994), the
first Chechen war (1994Ð1996), the period of
C h e c h n y a Õ s quasi-independence (1996Ð1999)
and the second Chechen war that began in 1999
and continues until now. Despite the fact that
the Kremlin has taken certain measures to put
an end to the conflict in the republic, these have
not produced the desired results. On the contra-
ry, the war is growing increasingly violent.
2. The impact of the rebellious Chechnya on con-
temporary Russia reaches far beyond the repu-
blicÕs territorial borders. Over the last twelve
years, the events in the republic have resounded
in Moscow, substantially influencing the shape
of contemporary Russia. The Chechen conflict
has had a considerable, largely negative impact
on the process of the Russian transformation
which followed the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the events in the North Caucasus, closely
connected with the situation on the Russian po-
litical scene, constituted landmarks in the histo-
ry of post-Soviet Russia.
3. Even today, it is difficult to overestimate the
impact of the Chechen conflict on certain areas
of Russian politics, economy and social life, al-
though this influence is certainly not dominant.
Chechnya is an important factor among many
other elements determining the shape of con-
temporary Russia. The ongoing war affects near-
ly all spheres: the internal situation, foreign po-
licy, government system, elites, institutions and
state structures, society, economy, media, etc.
Chechnya is a threat to the stateÕs security and
an obstacle to reforms, a source of corruption,
degeneration of the state administration and de-
moralisation of the Russian army. It affects the
views of the Russian elites and society as well as
the authoritiesÕ approach to citizens and such is-
sues as human rights. Developments in the re-
public were among the main stimuli behind the
reinforcement of the countryÕs power depart-
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ments, they also brought about the rise of au-
thoritarianism and restrictions on freedom of
speech during President PutinÕs rule, and promo-
ted an increase of Caucasophobia and Islamo-
phobia in the Russian society.
4. The solution of the Chechen problem is of im-
mense importance to contemporary Russia. The
experience of the last twelve years shows that
so long as there is no peace and stability in the
Caucasus, Russia will remain undemocratic and
its future largely unpredictable. Even though the
Kremlin is certainly aware of the pressing need
to promptly solve the Chechen conflict, the me-
asures taken by PutinÕs administration hardly
appear to bring the prospects of a true peace in
the Caucasus any closer.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the si-
gnificance of the Chechen issue for contempora-
ry Russia. Part I discusses the history of the con-
flict from 1991 to date and the impact of deve-
lopments in the republic on Russia as a whole.
Part II is an attempt to indicate the areas of Rus-
sian reality that are most deeply affected by the
Chechen problem. 
I. History of the Chechen 
conflict and its impact 
on developments in Ru s s i a
1. Origins of the conflict
The conflict in Chechnya, like all other conflicts
within the former USSR, bro ke out in the early
1990s. Its causes are deeply rooted in history. Fo l-
lowing are the events in mutual Ru s s i a n -C h e c h e n
relations that have contributed to this conflict:
Ð conquering of the North Caucasus by Russia in
the 19th century, preceded by the long and mur-
derous Caucasian War during which Chechens
greatly resisted the TsarÕs army;
Ð repressions of Chechens carried out by Rus-
sians, who treated the Caucasus as a conquered
colony rather than an integral part of the Rus-
sian empire and brutally put down numerous
Chechen rebellions, the last of which broke out
in 1944;
Ð repressions of the 1920s and 1930s which inc-
luded compulsory collectivisation and the Stali-
nist purges among Chechen intellectuals, clergy
and people whose authority was deeply respec-
ted in the republic;
Ð deportation of Chechens accused of collabora-
tion with Germans to Central Asia decreed by
Stalin in 1944;
Ð policy of the Soviet authorities towards the
Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Re-
public following the ChechensÕ return from exile
in 1957 (under this policy, Russians were favo-
u red in the republic and Chechens had re s t r i c t e d
access to education, administration offices, army,
etc.) combined with ChechnyaÕs economic under-
development and extensive unemployment
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As the Soviet Union broke up, central authorities
faltered and Russia slipped into an economic cri-
sis, all these factors made the Chechen problem,
suppressed for decades, explode with a renewed
force1.
2. The rule of Dzhokhar Dudaev
( 1 9 9 1 Ð 1 9 9 4 )
When Mikhail Gorbachev announced the pere-
stroika, a radical national movement began to
develop in Chechnya. It soon proposed indepen-
dence mottos and, in autumn 1990, Chechen de-
mocratic organisations established the Chechen
National Congress (CNC). The Congress carried
out a coup in Grozny a year later (August Ð Sep-
tember 1991), forcing the communist authorities
of the then Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic, led by the head of the Supre-
me Council of Checheno-Ingushetia, Doku Za-
vgaev, to step down. Shortly afterwards, Chech-
nya proclaimed independence and Dzhokhar Du-
daev, a retired general of the Soviet Army, beca-
me president of the new republic. The events of
autumn 1991 came to be known as Òthe Chechen
revolutionÓ. Chechnya refused to sign the Fede-
ration Treaty of 31 March 1992 and remained
outside the Russian state. Following a failed mi-
litary intervention in November 1991 (when the
Russians blew up landing troops at the Grozny
airport but soon retreated peacefully), Moscow
withdrew its forces from the republic, leaving
behind substantial quantities of weapons.
After the separatists came to power, Russia im-
posed a very ineffective economic blockade on
Chechnya, trying to force Dudaev into conces-
sions. The dictatorial rule of the Chechen leader
soon brought about an open conflict with the
opposition. Opposition forces even attempted
coups to overthrow Dudaev, several armed cla-
shes also took place and Grozny witnessed tho-
usands-strong demonstrations. In 1993, Moscow
began to actively support the opposition Interim
Council of Chechnya, hoping to topple Duda-
evÕs regime. However, the several attempts at ar-
med coups by opposition forces all failed2.
Initially, authorities in Moscow were not particu-
larly interested in the situation in Chechnya as
they focused on problems involved in the break-
up of the USSR, the development of a new sys -
tem of power in Russia, relations with former re-
publics of the empire and the rivalry between
Mikhail Gorbachev, then president of the USSR,
and Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian
Federal Soviet Socialist Republic. These issues
clearly overshadowed the situation in the re-
gions. Besides, the events taking place in Chech-
nya in the early 1990s to some extent resembled
the developments in other republics, such as Ta-
tarstan or Bashkiria, which had also proclaimed
independence and openly opposed the Kremlin3.
At that time, ChechnyaÕs impact on Russia was
mostly economic: the republic was gradually
transforming into an economic Òblack holeÓ (it
was becoming the centre of diverse types of ille-
gal business) and destabilising the situation in
the neighbouring entities of the Federation. 
3. The first Chechen war (1994Ð1996)
The first Chechen war commenced when Rus-
sian troops invaded Chechnya on 11 December
1994. The official reason for the armed interven-
tion was the need to Òrestore constitutional or-
derÓ in Chechnya and prevent separatism and in-
stability from spreading to the remaining repu-
blics of the North Caucasus. In fact, it was a lar-
ge group of Russian generals who had pushed
for war, intending to strengthen the position of
the army, improve its prestige, prevent the do-
wnsizing of the force and conceal illegal busi-
nesses in which the military were involved with
the Chechens. Deciding for military interven-
tion, Yeltsin hoped that, with the rapid victory
promised by the military, he would demonstrate
RussiaÕs power on the international scene and
show its strength and resolve in dealing with in-
ternal matters. Finally, Moscow also wished to
regain control over the Chechen section of the
oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk4.
In the first months of the war, Russian troops se-
ized Grozny and a major part of lowland Chech-
nya, but they were unable to break the resistan-
ce of Chechen guerrillas. The militants, widely
supported by locals, carried out successful guer-
rilla warfare. They even managed to perpetrate
several terrorist attacks beyond the Chechen
borders and, eventually, recaptured Grozny from
the Russians in August 1996. After Russians as-
sassinated Dzhokhar Dudaev in April 1996, the
Kremlin decided to meet the Chechens at the ne-
gotiating table and put an end to the war. This
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task was assigned to the Secretary of the Securi-
ty Council of the Russian Federation General
Aleksandr Lebed. After a few rounds of negotia-
tions, on 31 August 1996 Lebed and General
Aslan Maskhadov, Chief of the Chechen Staff, si-
gned a peace agreement in Khasav-Yurt. Russia
basically accepted ChechnyaÕs i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
and the question of the republicÕs ultimate sta-
tus was postponed for another five years. Shor-
tly afterwards, all Russian troops withdrew from
Chechnya and militants took over the rule5.
The outbreak of war, its development and conc-
lusion were of immense significance to the Rus-
sian Federation. The year 1994, which marked
the Russian invasion of Chechnya and 1996,
when the Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed,
were clear landmarks in the history of post-So-
viet Russia. When Yeltsin declared the war, he
hoped that the rapid victory expected by the mi-
litary would afford him not only the opportuni-
ty to demonstrate RussiaÕs power, but also crush
separatism in the other republics and prevent
the break-up of the Russian Federation, which
many politicians and analysts were forecasting.
However, it soon turned out that the war only
exposed the weakness and disintegration of the
Russian state. The Chechen issue, until then 
t reated as a local problem, became one of 
RussiaÕs gravest and most difficult problems. 
In addition, individual political parties and the
Kremlin itself treated the Chechen issue as an in-
strument to serve their own needs and manipu-
lated it to further their own interests. The nego-
tiations with Chechen militants in mid 1996,
which led to the conclusion of the Khasav-Yurt
peace agreement, and the unilateral suspension
of war operations in Chechnya announced by
Boris Yeltsin, were closely connected with the
presidential elections in Russia6. Putting an end
to the Chechen conflict, extremely unpopular
with Russian society, was intended to promote
Boris YeltsinÕs re-election as president. A prolon-
ged war was also prejudicial to the interests of
the fuel and energy resource lobby (because of
the instability in the North Caucasus, Western
investors in Azerbaijan preferred to export oil
from the region using the southern route bypas-
sing Russia). In 1996, the Russian oil lobby pro-
ved to be more influential than the power struc-
tures that wanted the war to continue. 
The military and political defeat in the war aga-
inst Chechen separatists was a shock to the en-
tire state and to the Russian army in particular.
The armyÕs prestige was impaired by its with-
drawal from Eastern European countries and
most of the former Soviet republics, and it now
took a further blow in the eyes of society. The
Russian army proved to be completely unprepa-
red for wars like the one in Chechnya. It suffered
enormous losses and its morale melted at a fri-
ghtening speed7. In times of the USSR, the Soviet
army was prepared for a confrontation with the
West and for a full-scale offensive military ope-
ration similar to the struggle with the German
army during World War II. Following the break-
up of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold
War, the Russian army faced new challenges and
threats: local conflicts with an ethnic backgro-
und and clashes with an internal enemy resor-
ting to guerrilla warfare and enjoying the sup-
port of local people. The defeat in Chechnya ope-
ned RussiaÕs eyes to the urgent need to reform
the Russian army and prepare it to cope with
new challenges8. The war in Chechnya also sho-
wed Moscow that major threats to state securi-
ty were no longer rooted in the West, but in the
regions south of Russia, mainly in the Caucasus
and Central Asia9. Finally, it exposed the ideolo-
gical vacuum left in the wake of communism.
ÒDefence of the constitutional orderÓ was hardly
a motivation for the soldiers, most of whom tre-
ated service in the Caucasus as a necessary evil
rather than patriotic duty. Chechen militants, on
the other hand, saw their participation in the
war as the fulfilment of a patriotic obligation.
They ware defending their homeland against an
aggressor and were, therefore, highly motivated.
As a direct consequence of the war, the Krem-
linÕs control over North Caucasian republics we-
akened and its sway over the South Caucasus al-
so faltered. The KremlinÕs efforts of 1993Ð1994
to restore control over Georgia and Azerbaijan
were questioned. The leaders of these countries
understood that they should not fear a Russian
military intervention if they infringed on the in-
terests of their northern neighbour. Undoubte-
dly, RussiaÕs image in the West was damaged as
well, as the country came in for frequent and
harsh criticism over the war and human rights
violations during military operations.
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Further dangerous consequences of the war inc-
luded the rise of Caucasophobia and Islamopho-
bia, which largely replaced widespread anti-Se-
mitism and rendered ethnic and religious rela-
tions within the Russian Federation tenser. Even
though the Chechens raised no Islamic slogans
during the first war, the war contributed signifi-
cantly to the radicalisation of Islam in Russia.
From there on, Muslim fundamentalism develo-
ped hand in hand with the Islamic revival. Fur-
thermore, the war brought about the mass mi-
gration of Chechens and Russians living in
Chechnya to the southern districts of Russia,
which bred conflicts between immigrants and
the local populations. Finally, in the aftermath of
the war, contemporary Russia had to face terro-
rism for the first time10.
4. The period of ChechnyaÕs
quasi-independence (1996Ð1999)
On 27 January 1997 presidential and parliamen-
tary elections were held in Chechnya. Aslan Ma-
skhadov, Chief of Staff of the Chechen army and
the most moderate of all the candidates, was
elected president. Initially, Maskhadov tried to
govern the country taking into account the inte-
rests and ambitions of individual commanders
and political groups, and was reluctant to rule
with an iron fist. This had catastrophic consequ-
ences for the country: anarchy raged as field
commanders refused to subordinate themselves
to the central authorities and the opposition,
which was growing in strength, pursued a de-
structive policy demanding that authorities step
down and Chechnya be declared an Islamic sta-
te. In mid 1998, the country was on the brink of
civil war. Even though Maskhadov advocated
the peaceful establishment of Chechen-Russian
relations, Russia itself offered him no assistance
in dealing with the Islamic opposition and secu-
ring public order in Chechnya. On the contrary,
Moscow would gladly use every opportunity to
discredit the idea of an independent Chechnya11.
In early 1999, authorities in Grozny decided to
crack down on anarchy, armed Islamic opposi-
tion and organised crime. In March, President
Maskhadov proclaimed Chechnya an Islamic sta-
te and introduced elements of the sharia law in-
to its legislation, while authorities began to
combat groups kidnapping people for ransom.
However, this failed to produce the expected re-
sults. In late July and early August 1999, radical
Islamic militant units (wahhabites), led by Sha-
mil Basaev and Emir Khattab, invaded the neigh-
bouring Dagestan from Chechnya in order to li-
berate the entire North Caucasus from Russian
rule and proclaim an Islamic state. 
As in 1991Ð1994, throughout the period of
ChechnyaÕs quasi-independence, the country re-
mained a Òblack holeÓ, i.e. a source of instability
spreading to the entire region of the North Cau-
casus. Kidnapping of people for ransom and
bringing them into Chechnya became one of the
most serious problems facing Federation entities
neighbouring the republic. Drug traffic, trading
weapons and illegally extracted oil thrived, whi-
le Chechen militant units continued to invade
Dagestan, Stavropol Krai and North Ossetia. Isla-
mic fundamentalists established a network of
training camps on Chechen territory, where
young Muslims from the entire Caucasus rece-
ived their training12. Events in Chechnya also in-
fluenced the situation in the neighbouring Dage-
stan. There, increasingly powerful Islamic radi-
cals demanded that the republic be transformed
into an Islamic state modelled on Chechnya. In
1999, Dagestani supporters of radical Islam se-
ized several villages near the Dagestani-Chechen
border and proclaimed them to be an indepen-
dent Islamic territory13. Moscow faced a real
threat of losing control not only over Chechnya,
but Dagestan as well. 
After the Khasav-Yurt agreements were signed,
Chechnya once again ceased to count among the
KremlinÕs key political problems. The attention
of Russian authorities was focused on other issu-
es such as President YeltsinÕs illness and the pro-
blem of the succession of power, the economic
crisis, relations with the West and the US in par-
ticular, or NATOÕs eastward enlargement. Besi-
des, the vagueness and instability of the situ-
ation in Chechnya was in keeping with the inte-
rests of many Russian groups, politicians and bu-
sinessmen (like the media magnate Boris Berezo-
vsky) who had broad and usually illegal business
relations with the Chechens. 
In 1996Ð1999, the Kremlin failed to develop any
political concept for Chechnya, and the question
of the republicÕs status, which was supposed to
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be resolved through bilateral negotiations, was
caught in a dead end. It seems that only the fe-
deral army had a clear idea of its policy towards
the republic during ChechnyaÕs quasi-indepen-
dence: namely, it was preparing to take revenge
for the 1996 defeat. Most of the Russian military
believed that politicians had betrayed the army
in Khasav-Yurt and took away its victory. Hoping
that war would break out again, the Russian Ge-
neral Staff reinforced the North Caucasian Mili-
tary District, which was provided with the best
equipment and manned with the most experien-
ced commanders and officers, and developed
a new war tactic: the first phase of RussiaÕs se-
cond military intervention in Chechnya was mo-
delled on the NATO operation in Kosovo. This se-
cured the Russian armyÕs success in the initial
phase of the second Chechen war14.
5. The second Chechen war 
(from 1999)
A pretext for the second invasion of Chechnya by
federal troops came with the raid of Islamic mi-
litants led by Basaev and Khattab on Dagestan
and a series of bomb attacks in Russian cities
(Moscow, Buinaksk, Volgodonsk) in September
1999, which claimed nearly 300 lives15. The Che-
chens were blamed for organising these attacks,
and the new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin announced an unrelenting campaign aga-
inst terrorism, gaining wide popularity with the
Russian society. In September 1999, Russia be-
gan mass bombings of Chechnya and on 1 Octo-
ber, Russian troops invaded the republic. The
commencement of military action brought on
a mass exodus of people, most of who fled from
the republic primarily to the neighbouring Ingu-
shetia, causing a humanitarian disaster there16.
Over a few months, Russians crushed the main
Chechen formations and gained control over
most of ChechnyaÕs territory. In spring 2000, the
decimated Chechen militants began a guerrilla
war, which still continues today.
In June 2000, the Kremlin announced the end of
the Òmilitary phaseÓ of the Òanti-terrorist opera-
tionÓ and established an interim civil admini-
stration in the republic, led by the former Òsepa-
ratistÓ mufti of Chechnya Akhmed Kadyrov. From
that point, Chechnya clearly ceased to occupy
a central position in the KremlinÕs policy and
RussiaÕs policy towards the republic became un-
coordinated and ineffective. Without taking any
real measures to end the conflict, authorities
tried to make society and the international com-
munity believe that a normalisation process was
taking place in Chechnya, and that economic re-
construction and a gradual return to peaceful li-
fe were under way. Meanwhile, a brutal guerril-
la war was ravaging the republic, and both sides
were committing massive human rights viola-
tions. The repression of civilians by the federal
army, and the military disintegration and we-
akening of the Chechen guerrillas (as compared
to the first war) contributed to the radicalisation
of actions taken by many militants, including re-
sorting to acts of terrorism17.
On 23 October 2002, the Chechens perpetrated
an act of terror unprecedented in the whole hi-
story of the Chechen conflict, evoking shock in
Russia and abroad. A squad of suicide bombers
led by Movsar Baraev seized the Moscow Dubro-
vka theatre taking some 800 hostages. The terro-
rists demanded an end to the war in Chechnya
and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the
republic. In the early morning of 25 October,
Russian special forces stormed the theatre buil-
ding killing all the terrorists and more than one
hundred hostages. Shamil Basaev admitted to
organising this attack. In the successive months,
militants also organised several bloody terrorist
attacks in Chechnya and North Ossetia killing se-
veral hundred people18. They announced their
intention to move the war into Russian territory
in the nearest future19.
Even though the terrorist attack on the Dubro-
vka theatre and the subsequent suicide bom-
bings exposed the failure of the KremlinÕs policy
towards Chechnya, President PutinÕs administra-
tion resolved to continue with the ÒChechenisa-
tionÓ policy launched in mid 2002. Its objective
was to legitimise Akhmed KadyrovÕs pro-Russian
team and gradually transfer power in the repu-
blic to them, while firmly refusing to enter peace
talks with militant representatives20. The Krem-
lin tried to present ÒChechenisationÓ as a genu-
ine peace process taking place in the republic,
but it is difficult to determine whether this poli-
cy was intended to end the war or just pretend
to do so21. In November 2002, the Chechen Inte-
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rior Ministry was established, in March 2003,
the new constitution of the republic was passed
(defining Chechnya as an inseparable part of
Russia) and, in June 2003, amnesty was declared
for the militants22. The Kremlin also announced
that presidential elections would be held in the
republic on 5 October 2003, to be followed by
parliamentary elections within a year of the re-
ferendum, that an agreement on the division of
powers between Moscow and Grozny would be
signed and that more funding would be provi-
ded to finance ChechnyaÕs economic reconstruc-
tion (including the payment of indemnities for
homes lost in the course of military operations).
Moscow also began to remove generals involved
in illegal businesses and those refusing to co-
operate with the republicÕs civil authorities. Ho-
w e v e r, these measures did not produce the
expected results, only strengthened the power
of ChechnyaÕs acting president Akhmed Kadyrov
and increased tensions in internal relations wi-
thin Chechnya (e.g. between Kadyrov and the
Chechen diaspora in Moscow or between Kady-
rov and the militants). Kadyrov, hated and consi-
dered a traitor by most of his compatriots, ma-
naged to subordinate nearly all central and re-
gional civil authorities of the republic and gain
a very strong position in relation to the Kremlin.
Presently, Kadyrov also has a substantial milita-
ry force Ð he controls the Chechen militia and
a Òbodyguard teamÓ of several thousand, which
recruits former militants and terrorises the Che-
chen people23. Even though the present leader of
the Chechen administration is inconvenient for
nearly all major groups in the republic, the
Kremlin continues to support him because Kady-
rov seems to be the only guarantor of the imple-
mentation of the ÒChechenisationÓ policy laun-
ched by the authorities24.
There is direct link between the outbreak of the
second Chechen war and the rise to power of
RussiaÕs current president Vladimir Putin. It may
be the single most striking example of how the
Chechen issue affects developments in to-
dayÕs Russia and how it is exploited as an instru-
ment in Russian politics. While the first war had
a negative impact on Boris YeltsinÕs presidency,
as most Russians were firmly opposed to it, the
outbreak of the second war became a kind of
springboard to power for the present Russian le-
ader. Yeltsin appointed the largely unknown Vla-
dimir Putin as prime minister at the time when
Russia was overwhelmed with fear following
the raid of Islamic militants on Dagestan and the
terrorist attacks of September 1999, and when
the media were fanning an anti-Chechen hyste-
ria. Shortly after coming to power, Putin anno-
unced a resolved decision to combat terrorism,
gaining widespread popularity with the Russian
society. The sense of being threatened by terro-
rist attacks, skilfully heated up through the use
of propaganda, continued to convince people of
the necessity to crack down on Chechen separa-
tists. The successes of the federal army in Chech-
nya reassured Russians that the decision to inte-
rvene was right, and most of them began to see
Putin as a providential man who saved their co-
untry. This was precisely what the ill Boris Yelt-
sin wanted to achieve when he nominated Vla-
dimir Putin as his successor and sought a way to
safeguard the latterÕs coming to power. On 31
December 1999, when PutinÕs popularity was at
its peak, Boris Yeltsin stepped down and trans-
ferred his duties as head of state to the Prime
Minister. On 26 March 2000, early presidential
elections were held in Russia, of which Putin
was the unquestionable winner. It appears that
the problem of the succession of power in the
Kremlin played a key role in the outbreak of the
second Chechen war, though there was also so-
me pre s s u re towards a new confrontation on the
part of the Russian army, humiliated by the defe-
at in the first war and the compulsory withdra-
wal from the republic in 1996, and eager to re i n-
f o rce its position in the Russian power stru c t u re s .
II. ChechnyaÕs impact on Ru s s i a
following the outbreak of the
second Chechen war 
1. Internal issues
The conflict in Chechnya is one of many factors
presently influencing the internal situation in
the Russian Federation. Developments in the re-
public are having an adverse affect on Russia, al-
though the real scale of this influence is difficult
to estimate. The Chechen issue is a serious pro-
blem for both the ruling team in the Kremlin and
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the Russian state as a whole, as it is difficult to
speak of a stable future and the balanced deve-
lopment of Russia until this issue is solved. On
the other hand, the situation in Chechnya is be-
ing exploited by the Kremlin in order to reach its
specific political goals both on the internal and
international scenes.
1.1. A vision of Ru s s i a Õ s f u t u r e
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Che-
chen conflict has been one of the most serious
political problems of the Russian Federation af-
fecting the countryÕs internal and foreign poli-
cies alike. RussiaÕs future as a modern, non-im-
perial and democratic state hinges on the solu-
tion of the Chechen issue. The present situation
in Chechnya impedes RussiaÕs transformation in
this direction. The KremlinÕs inability to cope
with Chechnya (both under Boris YeltsinÕs and
Vladimir PutinÕs rule) and the inability of Rus-
sian political elites to develop a coherent and
mature concept to end the conflict demonstrate
the absence of a clear vision of post-imperial
Russia. 
As the Kremlin lacks a clearly defined policy to-
wards Chechnya, the Russian central authorities
are also unable to develop a coherent policy for
the entire North Caucasus Ð the most turbulent
region of the Russian Federation. Solving the
Chechen issue is a necessary prerequisite for the
development of MoscowÕs North Caucasian poli-
cy. So far, Moscow has only been implementing
improvised manoeuvres and supporting local
corrupted post-communist ruling elites dissocia-
ted from their communities. The North Cauca-
susÕ serious economic and social problems and
the political, ethnic and religious conflicts preva-
iling in that area may soon seriously destabilise
the region.
1.2. A threat to state security
Chechnya is a serious threat to RussiaÕs internal
security. The most evident proof of this was last
yearÕs attack on Dubrovka. It demonstrated that
a group of armed terrorists arriving from Chech-
nya, thousands of kilometres away, is capable of
carrying out a terrorist operation on this scale.
Since the beginning of his presidency, Putin has
been building his position and prestige on pro-
mises of ensuring security for the state and ordi-
nary Russians. He began as Prime Minister by
promising the relentless prosecution of mili-
tants. Even though the attack in Dubrovka did
not ruin his image as a guarantor of security, it
certainly unsettled it. As successive events sho-
wed, Dubrovka was not an isolated case, but the
beginning of a terrorist campaign on a broader
scale. Suicide terrorist attacks modelled on tho-
se from Palestine became an inseparable ele-
ment of the Chechen conflict and Russian politi-
cal life. It seems that this ÒPalestinisationÓ of the
conflict in Chechnya will be irreversible unless
the situation in the republic undergoes a funda-
mental change25.
1.3. An obstacle to reforms
After becoming President, Vladimir Putin under-
took to carry out numerous important internal
reforms in the state26. However, the situation in
Chechnya constitutes a major obstacle to the im-
plementation of these reforms. Chechnya not
only consumes a large amount of ÒenergyÓ of the
authorities, who have to respond to crises in the
republic and push successive measures that are
still failing to produce positive results. Mainta-
ining such a large numbers of troops and amo-
unts of weapons in the republic and providing
logistic support for the army, etc. is an enormo-
us burden on the state budget, consuming funds
that could otherwise be spent on other purpo-
ses27. The republicÕs Òeconomic reconstructionÓ
has been progressing since mid 2000, absorbing
huge amounts of funding each year that fail to
improve the situation in Chechnya in any me-
asurable way28. Most of the federal budget funds
earmarked for the economic reconstruction of
Chechnya are stolen Òalong the wayÓ and the
rest is appropriated directly by the pro-Russian
Chechen authorities on site. 
1.4. The degenerating effect on state
s t r u c t u r e s
The existence of Chechnya in its present shape
within the Russian Federation contributes to the
degeneration of the Russian state structures in
charge of Chechnya-related issues, i.e. sections
of the state administration, the federal army, the
militia, secret services, the administration of ju-
stice, etc. It also demoralises individual officials,
functionaries and soldiers. This refers to institu-
tions beyond the republic dealing with ÒChechen
issuesÓ, as well as state bodies operating direc-
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tly in Chechnya29. Corruption and stealing of
budget funds for Chechnya (formally earmarked
for the Òanti-terrorist operationÓ and the recon-
struction of the republic) are widespread thro-
ughout all levels of the state administration30. In
addition, for many years Chechnya has basically
been a territory without any laws. Individual of-
ficials, the militar y, etc. do not need to abide by
any rules. Consequently, lawlessness prevails,
manifesting itself in the attitude of state bodies
towards Chechen civilians (the life or death of
ordinary people frequently hinges on the arbi-
trary decisions of individual representatives of
the authorities). The military, officials and mili-
tia functionaries are frequently involved in cri-
minal activities such as trade in illegally extrac-
ted oil, weapons and drugs, human trafficking,
etc. The war in Chechnya is their private war,
which they treat mainly as an opportunity to get
rich. This is why they disregard their stateÕs in-
terests, which they were sent to promote in the
rebellious republic. Lower rank military or offi-
cials sometimes sabotage or disregard the deci-
sions of higher instances. Individual Russian po-
wer departments (the Ministry of Defence and
the federal army, the Interior Ministry and the
Federal Security Service) compete for influence
in Chechnya and for legal and illegal revenues
from the war raging in that area. At the level of
the government and heads of individual depart-
ments, this rivalry is more moderate and less ap-
parent but in Chechnya, where various institu-
tions operate on a parallel basis, it is distinctly
visible. 
All this leads to the demoralisation of Russian
state structures. The problem is further exacer-
bated by the rotation of tens of thousands of pe-
ople from all over Russia who arrive in, and le-
ave Chechnya each year. For example, officers
and soldiers usually stay in the republic for no
longer than six months, following which they
are replaced by others. They take the models of
behaviour learnt there back to their permanent
jobs and homes. 
1.5. The increased influence 
of the power departments
In the aftermath of the second Chechen war the-
re has been a dangerous expansion of the influ-
ence of Russian power departments, i.e. the Mi-
nistry of Defence, the General Staff alongside the
entire federal army, the Interior Ministry and the
Federal Security Service. This new situation is
hardly conducive to democratic reforms in Rus-
sia, as the power departments and the people
forming them are direct heirs of the Soviet Army,
the Soviet Interior Ministry and the KGB. Preva-
iling attitudes in these departments are a Soviet-
style, imperial and superpower-like perception
of the world and society, and a conviction that
one should rule with an iron fist without taking
public opinion or societyÕs interests into acco-
unt. These attitudes impede the reform of the
power departments themselves, which is at pre-
sent urgently needed in Russia.
It is very difficult to estimate which of the po-
wer departments profited most from the war
and which gained the most influence. It seems
that compared to the other bodies, the federal
army, humiliated by the 1996 defeat and the for-
ced withdrawal from Chechnya, gained a lot. By
starting a new military intervention in the repu-
blic in autumn 1999 and scoring the initial suc-
cesses in the war against Chechen militants, the
military took revenge for that defeat and the
Òbetrayal of the politiciansÓ. Having gained
a strong position and taken control over Chech-
nya, the army is now the main opponent of any
changes in the republic that could bring about
a genuine ending to the war. For quite some ti-
me, the military have been trying to torpedo the
KremlinÕs moves intended to end the war. The
army is reluctant to accept the ÒChechenisationÓ
policy pursued by the Kremlin, which signifies
a drop in their powers to the benefit of ÒChe-
chen civiliansÓ. Army representatives have fre-
quently stressed that they will not allow Òano-
ther Khasav-YurtÓ and will not let their victory
be taken away from them. 
Today, Chechnya is a closed military zone in
which the federal army is the most influential
body31. Troops are repressing civilians on a mass
scale, most definitely with the approval of hi-
gher-rank commanders. It is in the best interest
of the military to continue with the Òanti-terro-
rist operationÓ for several reasons. Firstly, while
the operation in Chechnya continues, the ar-
myÕs position in the state will remain very
strong, bringing in large amounts of funding
and promotion opportunities for the army. Se-
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condly, the unstable situation in Chechnya, tre-
ated by the army as conquered territory, and its
isolation from the rest of the country, allow the
military to engage in a multitude of illegal busi-
nesses, especially the sale of oil illegally extrac-
ted in Chechnya to destinations all over the
North Caucasus32. To this end, Russian military
leaders frequently co-operate with Chechen field
commanders with whom they share the profits.
They have unspoken agreements on mutual tole-
rance in a given area and, besides, the militants
profit from the perpetuation of the present situ-
ation in the republic as well: for them, this pro-
vides an opportunity to get rich and retain con-
trol over certain groups of people in Chechnya.
Finally, ever since the conflict began, the army
has been robbing civilian property, mainly du-
ring the so-called zachistki, i.e. the pacification
of Chechen villages accused of supporting the
guerrillas. It has been accepting bribes without
any limitations, chiefly at checkpoints on roads
scattered all over the republic, trading in impri-
soned people and selling the bodies of those kil-
led to their families33.
In many matters, President Putin, who came to
power Òthanks toÓ the war in Chechnya, must
take into account the interests of the military
who have become much more influential in the
present phase of the conflict. The army has
strengthened its position in relations with the
remaining Russian power departments, especial-
ly the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security
Service (these three institutions have a long hi-
story of competing for influence in Chechnya
and in Russia as a whole). For many Russian ge-
nerals, Chechnya was the beginning of a politi-
cal career. For example, General Viktor Kazant-
sev, the former commander of federal troops in
the Caucasus, is presently the Russian presi-
dentÕs envoy to the Southern Federal District;
General Anatoli Kvashnin, the former comman-
der of the North Caucasian Military District, is
presently Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation, and General Vladimir
Shamanov, the former commander of the 58th
Army in Chechnya, is Governor of the Ulyanovsk
oblast. The federal army has gained an unqu-
estionable and apparently permanent influence
in the entire North Caucasus (especially in the
eastern part), and the region is ever more frequ-
ently referred to as Òthe military republicÓ34.
1.6. The rise of authoritarianism 
in Ru s s i a
The Chechen conflict, and especially the second
Chechen war, helped the political forces striving
to reinforce the authoritarian system of power
and restrict civil rights in Russia. The outbreak of
war against ÒChechen terroristsÓ and the threat
of Òinternational terrorismÓ overemphasised by
the Kremlin were among the factors allowing
Vladimir Putin to create this kind of power sys-
tem and, in particular, reduce the role of the re-
gions and the media. The Kremlin has also used
the threat of Chechen terrorism to integrate Rus-
sian society in the face of an internal and exter-
nal danger and distract its attention from other
important problems faced by the country.
Freedom of speech in Russia and the Russian me-
dia were hit especially badly by the second Che-
chen war. During the first war, Russian and fore-
ign journalises faced no restrictions on access to
Chechnya and there were no substantial inte-
rventions in the content of their coverage of the
events in the republic (this refers both to press
and television). Today, the situation has changed
radically. Chechnya is a zone closed to indepen-
dent reporters. Articles and TV news broadcasts
on the situation there are censored or self-censo-
red by most media35. The stateÕs control over the
media is not limited to coverage of the develop-
ments in Chechnya. The Kremlin has used the
war in the republic and the threat of terrorism
overemphasised by its propaganda machinery to
restrict freedom of speech in Russia in general.
Only a few Russian media can afford to criticise
Russian policy in Chechnya and openly oppose
the Kremlin on other issues, however, these are
usually low-circulation newspapers or radio sta-
tions and websites with small audiences36.
1.7. The political elites and Russian 
s o c i e t y
To some extent, the war in Chechnya is affecting
the views and attitudes of the Russian political
elites and the way they see Russia and the
world. As regards Chechnya, most forces on the
Russian political scene hold positions similar to
that expressed in the KremlinÕs official policy.
They firmly deny the Chechens their right to le-
ave the Federation, refuse to allow negotiations
with the militants, believe that a hard line poli-
cy should be implemented towards Chechnya
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and negate crimes committed by Russian troops.
This attitude to the Chechen issue influences the
way politicians, journalists and analysts see Rus-
siaÕs other internal and external problems. It al-
so shows that imperialist and superpower-like
thinking still dominates the Russian political
scene. The majority of Russian society thinks the
same way. Politicians such as Sergei Kovalov, jo-
urnalists like Anna Politkovska or social organi-
sations like Memorial, who openly criticise
Kremlin for its Òiron fistÓ policy, for initiating the
war in Chechnya and for massive human rights
violations in the republic, and who call on au-
thorities to stop the war and begin negotiations
with the Chechens, constitute a small, if not
marginal, section of the Russian political elite.
They hold hardly any significance in Russian po-
litics and have barely any support from society.
The Chechen conflict is a major obstacle impe-
ding the development of a democratic civil so-
ciety in Russia. It perpetuates the traditional
passivity of Russian society, the susceptibility of
most people to official propaganda and the co-
nviction that any objection against the doings of
the authorities is pointless. Even though public
opinion polls show that most Russians are be-
hind the conclusion of the war in Chechnya and
a large group would be willing to support nego-
tiations with militants37, people approve the
KremlinÕs policy towards Chechnya by failing to
protest. This attitude, typical of the Russian so-
ciety, manifested itself following the terrorist at-
tack in Dubrovka in October 2002. Even though
more than one hundred hostages died after the
troops storming the building used an unknown
gas and failed to organise the evacuation proper-
ly (exposing Russia to fierce criticism from the
West), most Russians expressed their support for
the presidentÕs decision and admitted that he
had had no other choice38.
There is also a link between the situation in
Chechnya and the Russian authoritiesÕ attitude
towards citizens and their rights. Unlike in de-
mocratic states of law, the Russian state and its
leaders are above individual people, their rights,
constitutional freedoms and frequently even
above personal dignity. This model is perpetu-
ated, for example, by the way the authorities
treat the soldiers fighting in the Caucasus (they
are compulsorily sent to the conflict region whe-
re their commanders disrespect their rights and
frequently unnecessarily expose them to the risk
of death), ordinary people incidentally involved
in the conflict (e.g. the hostages in Dubrovka),
Chechen refugees in Ingushetia (denied assistan-
ce by the state and forced to return to the war-
ravaged republic) and civilians in Chechnya
(whose basic rights are constantly being viola-
ted and who are, after all, citizens of the Russian
Federation).
1.8. Caucasophobia and Islamophobia 
in Ru s s i a
The war in Chechnya stimulates the rise of na-
tionalist and xenophobic sentiments in Russia,
which leads to national or even racial and reli-
gious conflicts. The steady growth of the Cauca-
sian diaspora in the ÒRussianÓ regions of the Rus-
sian Federation, especially in Moscow, is condu-
cive to these types of developments39. Tensions
are arising between the local Slavic population
and newcomers from the North and South Cau-
casus and Central Asia. Conflicts between diffe-
rent nationalities are superimposed on religious
clashes, as most of the immigrants from these
regions are Muslims. Hatred of Chechens, fanned
by Russian propaganda and the media-promoted
Chechen stereotype defining them as being ban-
dits, terrorists and kidnappers (this kind of pro-
paganda reached its peak in autumn 1999 follo-
wing attacks in Russian cities) is automatically
extended to all Òpersons of Caucasian nationali-
tyÓ40. Contemptuously referred to as ÒblackÓ in
everyday speech, emigrants from the Caucasus
are permanently persecuted by the militia. The-
re are also anti-Caucasian pogroms, to which pu-
blic security services usually respond passively.
A substantial role in the dissemination of chau-
vinistic, anti-Caucasian and anti-Muslim attitu-
des in society is played by various nationalistic
or Cossack organisations and some high officials
and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The
growing aversion towards Muslims is also fuel-
led by the KremlinÕs official propaganda, which
represents Russia as a victim of Òinternational Is-
lamic terrorismÓ. It is a justified claim that, at
the moment, Caucasophobia and, to a smaller
extent, Islamophobia, are widespread in Rus-
sia41. This poses a major threat to the stateÕs sta-
bility, given the fact that the percentage of non-
Slavic and Muslim people in RussiaÕs population
is increasing rapidly. The exact number of Mu-
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slims in the Russian Federation is difficult to es-
tablish, but they probably account for seven to
15 percent of the population42.
1.9. The impact of Chechnya 
on the North Caucasus 
The Russian North Caucasus is the region most
affected by the situation in Chechnya43. The Cau-
casus, which always used to be one region, is
presently broken into many isolated parts and
divided by dozens of borders. The situation in
Chechnya has contributed to this. Constituent
republics of the Russian Federation neighbo-
uring Chechnya have remained in the frontline
zone for over ten years. Huge numbers of troops,
militia forces and detachments of other Russian
power structures are stationed there, and the
entire region is covered with a network of road
checkpoints resembling state borders. People ha-
ve a limited ability to move from one republic to
another and they have to undergo endless
checks by public security services. The territo-
ries of Ingushetia, Dagestan and North Ossetia
sometimes witness clashes with Chechen mili-
tants trying to reach Chechnya from Georgia
(Russia has repeatedly accused the latter of tole-
rating separatist bases in its territory) or hiding
from the Russian army. There is a serious risk
that the war could spread to the neighbouring
republics, as the radical militants have frequen-
tly announced (in June 2003, the first serious ter-
rorist attack was carried out in North Ossetia).
The situation is particularly complicated in Ingu-
shetia, temporary home for 70 to 100 thousand
Chechen refugees whom the authorities are try-
ing to force to return to Chechnya. There are al-
so large groups of Chechen refugees in Dage-
stan, South Ossetia, Stavropol Krai, Krasnodar
Krai and the Rostov Oblast. This situation breeds
serious ethnic and religious tensions that may
transform into open conflict. The Chechen issue
is straining relations between Chechens and
Russians, as well as between the native Slavic
people of southern Russia and ÒCaucasianÓ im-
migrants44.
Because of the proximity of Chechnya, the North
Caucasus has become the region with the hi-
ghest rates of organised crime in the entire Rus-
sian Federation45. The evident radicalisation of
Chechen Islam observed since the mid 1990s has
also contributed substantially to the develop-
ment of extremist Muslim organisations in the
republics of the North Caucasus, particularly in
Dagestan and Karachay-Cherkessia46. Because of
the disastrous economic situation of the region
and the widespread conviction that Moscow has
left the Caucasian republics to fend for themse-
lves, such groups are increasingly popular, espe-
cially with young people. In the nearest future,
this fact may play a substantial destabilising ro-
le in entire North Caucasus.
The Chechen conflict is also having an adverse
effect on the economic situation in the North
Caucasus. The disintegration of the socialist eco-
nomy, the closing down of thousands of facto-
ries and businesses, breaking off of economic
links with the South Caucasus, corruption of au-
thorities and other factors have caused a steadi-
ly deepening economic crisis in the region. The
poverty-stricken North Caucasian republics can
function solely with subsidies from the federal
budget. The Chechen conflict, which has been
continuing for more than a decade, has exacer-
bated the catastrophic economic situation of the
North Caucasus. The region has been split into
two parts: Dagestan in the East and the rema-
ining republics in the West. Economic contacts
between these two parts have been largely re-
stricted because of transport difficulties, among
other factors. Following the outbreak of war in
Chechnya, it became impossible to use several
important roads crossing the republic, including
the railway main and the motorway from Rostov
on Don to Makhachkala and Baku47. Because of
the instability in Chechnya (and the conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the borders betwe-
en the Russian Federation, on the one hand, and
Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other, have actu-
ally been closed. Only a small number of people
is able to cross them, hence the inhabitants of
the North Caucasus being deprived of the oppor-
tunity to make a living on cross-border trade48.
The second war in Chechnya has ÒdisciplinedÓ
the remaining North Caucasus republics and we-
akened separatist tendencies emerging there.
With his war ÒscareÓ, President Putin has been
able to get rid of troublesome republic leaders,
e.g. the long-time (1991Ð2001) president of Ingu-
shetia Ruslan Aushev was replaced by a general
of the Federal Security Service, Murat Ziazikov49.
Finally, the war has contributed to the erosion of
the sense of a Caucasian community. During the
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first war, Chechens enjoyed universal sympathy
and support in the region, but today people tend
to blame them for the conflict and largely appro-
ve of the military solution to the Chechen pro-
blem.
2. Foreign policy
Ever since the first war broke out in 1994, the
Chechen issue has had a substantial influence on
the foreign policy of the Russian Federation,
both in terms of its general direction, and rela-
tions with individual states. The conflict in
Chechnya not only made Moscow aware of the
threats from the South (the Caucasus, Central
Asia, Near and Middle East and Arab countries),
but it also had a substantial and largely negati-
ve effect on its relations with Western Europe,
the United States and other countries.
2.1. New challenges in the South
Throughout the history of the USSR, the rela-
tions (confrontation) with the West were the
most important area of MoscowÕs foreign policy.
This changed with the break-up of the Soviet
empire: Russia no longer had to fear any threats
from the West. On the contrary, it appeared that
the interests of Moscow and the Western world
were convergent in many ways. However, the si-
tuation in countries and regions south of Russia
also changed radically. A number of new states
emerged, ethnic and religious conflicts broke
out, geopolitical relations in Afghanistan, the
Caucasus and Central Asia were complicated,
and the menace of Muslim fundamentalism, se-
paratism and terrorism came into view. Conse-
quently, threats from the southern direction be-
came an increasingly difficult problem and chal-
lenge for Russia. Even though the failed Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan was the first indica-
tion of the changing geopolitical situation in the
South, Moscow did not realise the proportions of
the problem until the Chechen war broke out.
Before, conflicts on the EmpireÕs southern out-
skirts were treated as marginal troubles and the
problems emerging there were seen as being of
secondary importance. The Kremlin had to face
an escalation of the Chechen conflict and espe-
cially the raid of Islamic militants on Dagestan,
the outbreak of the second Chechen war, the in-
creasingly tense situation in Central Asia and
the activities of Islamic radicals in the Fergana
Valley and, finally, the TalibanÕs rise to power in
Afghanistan, in order to realise that the real in-
ternational challenge for todayÕs Russia was the
Òsouthern problemÓ50.
2.2. Chechnya vs. Ru s s i a Õ s relations 
with the We s t
Western Europe
When Russia initiated the first Chechen war, it
came in for severe criticism from the West,
which continued until the signing of the Khasav-
Yurt agreements in 1996. On its part, Russia ac-
cused European countries and organisations of
lawless interference in its internal affairs and su-
spected that the criticism was intended to un-
dermine its position in the continent. Initial en-
thusiasm for Europe displayed by the Russian
elites and authorities gradually waned and gave
way to distrust, lack of understanding and aver-
sion in the aftermath of the Chechen war and
the Western countriesÕ disapproval of Ru s-
siaÕs human rights violations. A similar situation
took place after the Kremlin started the second
war in Chechnya in October 1999. At that time,
the European Union even imposed some limited
sanctions on Russia, while the OSCE and the Co-
uncil of Europe threatened that Moscow could
be expelled from these organisations. Things be-
gan to change with time, following the Russian
armyÕs successes in the Caucasus. 
The emergence of a n e w, energetic and modern
Russian leader and the desire to maintain good
economic relations with Russia overshadowed
the European values of democracy and human ri-
ghts. The Chechen issue gradually lost pro m i n e n-
ce in relations between Russia and Western Euro-
pean states, and European politicians were loath
to openly criticise Moscow for its Chechen policy.
Nevertheless, the Chechen issue does affect the
K remlin relations with the West: it undermines
the European countriesÕ and the Euro p e a n
U n i o nÕ s confidence in Russia as a partner for co-
operation, especially when it comes to security.
E u ropean organisations such as OSCE and the Co-
uncil of Europe have adopted a stricter attitude
t o w a rds Ru s s i a Õ s Chechen policy. They are syste-
matically criticising and even condemning Mo-
scow over the inadequate use of force against
Chechen separatists and human rights violations
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in the republic, which brings on frequent crises
and tensions in mutual re l a t i o n s5 1. Even though
Russia formally co-operates with these org a n i s a-
tions on issues relating to Chechnya, it actually
tries to minimise their presence in the re p u b l i c
and rejects the possibility that they could play
a role in the regulation of the Chechen conflict.
The United States
During the first Chechen war, the attitude adop-
ted by Washington towards the Russian policy in
Chechnya differed from the one prevailing in Eu-
rope. Bill ClintonÕs administration was much less
inclined to criticise Moscow for initiating a mili-
tary operation in the Caucasus, emphasising
that the Chechen issue was the RFÕs internal pro-
blem. The outbreak of the second Chechen war
coincided with a crisis in Russian-US relations
caused by NATOÕs eastward enlargement and its
operation in Kosovo, of which Moscow strongly
disapproved. Washington condemned the Krem-
lin for initiating the anti-terrorist operation in
Chechnya and repeatedly criticised Russia for
human rights violations in the republic calling
on Moscow to begin negotiations with militants.
There was a link between this stand of the Uni-
ted States and the fact that, at that time, Russia
and the United States were competing for influ-
ence in the Caucasus and Central Asia over Ca-
spian oil and gas resources.
However, the situation began to change gradual-
ly even before 11 September 2001. The rivalry
over oil resources in the Caspian region was no
longer as heated and Washington began to see
the positive sides of RussiaÕs influence in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. A breakthrough in
Russian-US relations came with the terrorist at-
tacks on the United States and RussiaÕs joining
of the anti-terrorist coalition formed by George
W. Bush. From that moment on, the Kremlin co-
uld represent its Òanti-terrorist operationÓ in
Chechnya as part of the worldwide struggle aga-
inst terrorism and claim that Russia was the first
country to have faced the challenge of interna-
tional terrorism. At the same time, President Pu-
tin had the opportunity to justify the Russian ar-
myÕs activities in the Caucasus52. In return for
the support granted by the Kremlin to Washing-
ton following 11 September 2001, the United
States adopted a less critical disapproving attitu-
de towards RussiaÕs policy in Chechnya53.
2.3. Chechnya vs. MoscowÕs r e l a t i o n s
with other CIS countries
The first Chechen war weakened RussiaÕs posi-
tion in the entire post-Soviet region, especially
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. RussiaÕs defeat
showed the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uz-
bekistan, the Baltic states and Ukraine that it
was not possible to rebuild the empire through
the use of military power: Moscow had neither
enough political will nor sufficient military for-
ce. The role of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States lost a good deal of its significance,
and Russia began to prefer bilateral relations
with the former Soviet republics to co-operation
within the CIS. In 1994Ð1996, the CIS countries
refused to back Moscow in its dispute with NA-
TO and an organisation uniting post-Soviet sta-
tes but excluding Russia, i.e. the GUUAM, began
to form within the Commonwealth54.
The second war in Chechnya and Vladimir Pu-
tinÕs rise to power changed the situation in the
CIS radically. By initiating a new intervention in
Chechnya and launching its hard line policy to-
wards the republic, Russia demonstrated its po-
wer and made it clear that the Kremlin could re-
spond resolutely to those opposing it. In 1999,
Russia also began to press CIS countries (espe-
cially Georgia and Azerbaijan), demanding their
unequivocal support for the Òanti-terrorist ope-
rationÓ in Chechnya and co-operative policies ta-
king into account MoscowÕs interests in the re-
gion55. This instigated many tensions, mainly in
Russian-Georgian relations 56. In the end, coun-
tries of the region adopted more pro-Russian po-
licies and began to seek rapprochement with
Moscow, while GUUAM lost its significance. This
way, the second Chechen war constituted a fac-
tor contributing to the strengthening of Rus-
siaÕs position in the post-Soviet region during
PutinÕs rule. 
2.4. Ru s s i a Õ s relations with other 
c o u n t r i e s
Arab countries and Israel
The Chechen conflict has been one of the main
factors bringing about a change in RussiaÕs tra-
ditional policy towards the Near East, i.e. Arab
countries and Israel. Throughout the Cold War,
Soviet foreign policy was distinctly anti-Israeli
and pro-Arab. However, the support granted to
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Chechen separatists by many Arab countries in-
cluding Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar and Kuwait, and their backing of wahha-
bism and Islamic fundamentalism in Russia and
the entire post-Soviet area, led to a change in
RussiaÕs attitude towards these countries57. Whi-
le Arab countries officially maintained that
Chechnya was RussiaÕs internal problem and
that the Kremlin had legitimate jurisdiction over
the republic, they were unable or unwilling to
stop the numerous organisations and individu-
als supporting the separatists or sending volun-
teers into Chechnya. In the aftermath of the Che-
chen wars, relations between Russia and Israel
improved for the first time in history. Tel Aviv
and Moscow began to develop official contacts,
co-operated in the field of secret services and
mutually backed each otherÕs hard line policies
on terrorism58.
China
The conflict in Chechnya has also influenced re-
lations between Moscow and Beijing. From the
very beginning, China resolutely backed the firm
policy of Russian authorities towards the rebel-
lious republic. In return, the Chinese hoped to
win RussiaÕs support for their policies on Tibet,
Taiwan and Xinjiang (where they struggled over
Uygur irredentism). BeijingÕs position is that
each state has the full right to use military force
in its territory and other countries should not in-
terfere with such stateÕs internal affairs, espe-
cially when it comes to separatism and human
rights. This is in keeping with the Russian stand-
point. This way, the Chechen conflict served to
bring the positions of Moscow and Beijing closer
on the international scene59.
III. Outlook for the future
The conflict in Chechnya, which dates back to
the early 1990s, has become one of the symbols
of post-Soviet Russia and its transformation. Al-
though it is just one of many factors determi-
ning the present and future shape of this coun-
try, it is difficult to overestimate the significance
of the Chechen issue for todayÕs Russia. The two
Chechen wars have not only affected the inter-
nal situation in the Russian Federation, but also
MoscowÕs foreign policy and Russian society. Re-
cent events in Chechnya, and especially the se-
ries of suicide attacks in the republic, the North
Caucasus and the Russian capital suggest that
Chechnya may play a significant role in influen-
cing developments in the Russian Federation
over the nearest future. Even though the Krem-
lin is taking some measures to normalise the si-
tuation in the republic (amnesty, presidential
elections, the agreement on the division of po-
wers between Moscow and Grozny), these me-
asures appear unlikely to bring about an end to
the conflict as they aim to eliminate its sources
(separatism) in a unilateral manner rather than
through dialogue with the Chechen society and
the anti-Russian opposition. However, one can
expect continued instability in the republic and
new terrorist attacks both in Chechnya and bey-
ond its borders. This means that the Chechen is-
sue will continue to affect Russia similarly to
how it does today, and the adverse processes sti-
mulated by the conflict in Chechnya will conti-
nue. The republic will remain a threat to Rus-
siaÕs security, a barrier to reforms and a source
for the degeneration and demoralisation of the
state administration and the Russian army.
It appears that the Chechen problem will also 
affect the future of the Russian Federation. 
The nature of this influence will depend mainly
on whether the Kremlin manages to develop and
carry out a practical plan to end the conflict in
the longer term, or whether it continues with
the current policy involving the Òanti-terrorist
operationÓ and strengthening pro-Russian au-
thorities in the republic, which seems to be do-
omed to failure in its present shape. It seems
that, as long as there is no peace and stability in
the Caucasus, Russia will not become ademocra-
tic country respecting human rights and civil
freedoms, and its political situation will remain
susceptible to destabilisation. 
Maciej Falkowski
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1 The reasons why the Russian-Chechen conflict turned in-
to the longest and most bloody war in the entire post-So-
viet area include the specific traits of Chechen society, i.e.
its division into competing clans (teips) that unite when fa-
cing a common enemy; and the absence of modern elites,
and the system of Chechen values, including freedom ver-
ging on anarchy, egalitarianism, aversion to externally im-
posed authority, a preference for clan laws based on the
principle of bloody vendetta over written laws, a sense of
honour and irrational behaviour of individuals and entire
communities, etc. For more information on problems regar-
ding the social structure of contemporary Chechnya see:
Dmitri Furman (ed.), Chechnia i Rossiia: obshchestva igosu-
darstva, Moscow 1999.
2 For more information on the history of the Chechen con-
flict from the early 1990s until the end of the first Chechen
war see: Piotr Grochmalski, Czeczenia: rys prawdziwy, Wro-
c¸aw: atla2 1999.
3 Troops were not withdrawn from any of the other repu-
blics and, following the initial period of conflict with the
Kremlin, all of them ultimately signed the Federation Treaty
of March 1992 (by 1994). There are grounds to believe that
Dudaev did not aspire for ChechnyaÕs full independence
either. It seems that he played a kind of game with the
Kremlin hoping to elicit a good deal of independence by
making far-reaching demands. The developments in Chech-
nya and, above all, the shaping of the political situation in
the Kremlin (the increased influence of advocates of milita-
ry intervention) brought about the transformation of the
Russian-Chechen conflict into an open war.
4 Other causes for the outbreak of the Chechen war include
ill-considered, illogical and venturesome moves of Chechen
and Russian leaders motivated by an excess of ambition,
the failure of many politicians on both sides, including
Dzhokhar Dudaev, to objectively assess the situation, the
pursuit of private, usually economic, interests and alack of
professionalism among both Chechen and Russian politi-
cians, etc. 
5 The outcome of the almost two-year-long war was tragic.
The war claimed approx. 60 thousand lives, including ap-
prox. five thousand Russian soldiers and approx. ten tho-
usand militants. Hundreds of thousands of people fled
Chechnya (most of the refugees were Russians). As a result
of the war, Chechnya became almost ethnically homogeno-
us, as most Russians and Ingush people left permanently.
The war also brought about a deep transformation of Che -
chen society. The original clan structure and clan elders lost
their former significance and were replaced by young field
commanders who rose to power in the aftermath of the vic-
torious first war. See: Jacek Cichocki, Konflikt rosyjsko-cze-
czeÄski, Warsaw: CES 1997; V. A. Tishkov, Obshchestvo vvo-
oruzhennom konflikte: Etnografiia chechenskoi voiny, Mo-
scow: Nauka 2001.
6 Nevertheless, the Khasav-Yurt peace agreement wasnÕt si-
gned until after the presidential elections of June 1996, in
August 1996.
7 The fact that the Soviet Army was not prepared to deal
with guerrillas had been previously exposed by the inte-
rvention in Afghanistan; however, the poor style and
extent of the ArmyÕs defeat in Chechnya were considerably
greater. During the Afghan war, the Soviet Army failed to
overpower the mujaheddin who received massive support
form the West and the Arab world. In Chechnya, however,
the Russian Army gave in to the levy of masses of highlan-
ders defending their villages.
8 For more information on the impact of the first Chechen
war on the Russian army see: Witold Pasek, Armia rosyjska
po Czeczenii, Eurazja: CES No. 5/1995; Andrzej Grajewski,
Federalni po Czeczenii, Eurazja: CES No. 5/1995.
9 See: Aleksei Malashenko, Dmitri Trenin, Vremia yuga, Mo-
scow: Moscow Carnegie Center 2002, p. 180Ð188.
10 During the fist Chechen war, several major terrorist acts
were committed, including hijackings of planes and buses.
The greatest acts of terror in 1994Ð1996 were two raids car-
ried out by Chechen militants and the taking of hundreds
of hostages. The first one was carried out in June 1995 by
Shamil BasaevÕs detachment that seized a hospital in the
town of Budennovsk in Stavropol Krai taking some one tho-
usand hostages. This operation was a success for the Che-
chens: they were allowed to safely return to Chechnya whe-
re the Russians and the Chechens entered into negotiations
concerning the terms of a cease-fire. The other operation
took place in January 1996 when militants led by Salman
Raduev seized a hospital in Kizlar, Dagestan, once again ta-
king hundreds of hostages. This time the Russians refused
to negotiate with the militants who withdrew to Chechnya
following a few days of fighting near the village of Pervo-
maiskoye.
11 To this end, Russia would publicise the cases of people,
mainly foreigners, being kidnapped for ransom. These ty-
pes of kidnappings were widespread in Chechnya in
1996Ð1999. There was considerable evidence suggesting
that some of them were perpetrated by the Russian secret
services trying to destabilise the situation in Chechnya and
prepare the ground for a new military intervention. There
were also documented instances of secret services co-ope-
rating with Islamic radicals in Chechnya, even following
the outbreak of the second war in the republic (Sanobar
Shermatova, Tainaia voina spetssluzhb, Moskovskie Novosti,
8 August 2000).
12 A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., p. 101Ð105.
13 This was agroup of several villages in western Dagestan
in the ÒKadar zoneÓ (the Botlichsk and Tsumadin regions),
which included Kadar, Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi.
14 In 1999 and 2000, Russian troops in Chechnya pursued
a different tactic than during the first war: first, they bom-
bed the positions of militants and civilian facilities for over
a month in order to hit the Chechen forces as hard as possi-
ble and force civilians to leave Chechnya; next, they seized
the lowland part of Chechnya and Grozny and finally blew
up landing troops on the Chechen-Georgian border preven-
ting Chechens from advancing towards Georgia. In spring
2000, nearly all of Chechnya was in Russian hands.
1 5 Russian authorities have blamed these attacks on the Che-
chens, but it remains unclear to date just who was actually
behind them. There is substantial evidence indicating that
these attacks may have been perpetrated by the Russian se-
c ret services. This is the opinion of Aleksandr Litvinenko,
C E S  S t u d i e s
a former Federal Security Services (FSS) officer who fled to
G reat Britain (he presents his view in the book Chechen-
s koye koleso by Aleksandr Mikhailov, Moscow: Sovershenno
s e k retno 2002) and the media magnate and political oppo-
nent of president Putin, Boris Berezovsky (he attempts to
p rove his case in the movie ÒAssassination of Ru s s i a Ó ) .
16 In the early phase of the war, approx. 350 thousand pe-
ople fled Chechnya, most of which went to Ingushetia. Pre-
sently, some 70 to 100 thousand Chechen refugees remain
in the republic, of which approx. 20 thousand live in refu-
gee camps (source: http://www. m e m o. ru / h r / h o t p o i n t s /
N -Caucas/ingush/winter2002.htm). Since mid October
2002, they are being forced to return to Chechnya. In this
manner, the Kremlin is trying to demonstrate that the situ-
ation in the republic is becoming normalised. There are al-
so several thousand or several tens of thousands Chechen
refugees in Dagestan, Georgia and Stavropol Krai. Incre-
asingly more Chechens who managed to leave the republic
are heading to the West, to destinations such as Poland, the
Czech Republic, Germany and Belgium.
17 In the present war, Chechens are avoiding open confron-
tation with the federal troops and are not attempting to
reclaim individual villages, as was the case during the first
war. They are focusing on planting landmines along routes
used by Russian military columns, firing at posts of federal
troops and assassinating Chechens collaborating with Mo-
scow. For a while now some militants have been resorting
to Palestinian-style suicide attacks. 
18 On 27 December 2002, suicide bombers blew up the bu-
ilding of the pro-Russian administration in Grozny using
a truck loaded with explosives, killing over 70 people. In
May 2003, the regional administration and FSS building in
the village of Znamenskoye (northern Chechnya) was de-
stroyed in a similar way. This attack claimed approx. 60 li -
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explosives during a religious ceremony in Iliskhan-Yurt (the
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a female suicide bomber blew up a bus in Mozdok (North
Ossetia) carrying Russian airmen as it drove by, killing 
some 20 people. Shamil Basaev claimed responsibility for
all of these attacks.
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Tushino airport in Moscow where a rock music festival was
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this attack on the Chechens, but there has been no convin-
cing evidence to substantiate this, and none of the Chechen
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20 President Aslan Maskhadov was accused of organising
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ner in negotiations. Nevertheless, behind-the-scenes talks
have taken place with some Chechen leaders who were pro-
mised to be admitted into political life in Chechnya.
21 For more information on the Chechenisation policy see:
Aleksei Makarkin, Chechenizatsya: proiekt PutinaÐKadyro-
va, http://www. p o l i t c o m . ru/2002/spec_pr3.php; Aleksei
Makarkin, Krizisnoie upravlenie chechenizatsyei,
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supposed to cover persons who committed offences in the
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1993. The precondition is that militants surrender their
arms by 1 September this year. The amnesty will also cover
Russian soldiers who committed offences against civilians.
The amnesty will not include perpetrators of serious crimes
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rorism. Because of the absence of security guarantees for
former militants, the short duration of the amnesty and the
exclusion of persons convicted for serious crimes, there is
a question mark over how effective the amnesty will be for
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the politico-economic changes taking place during Vladimir
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3 1 Pre s e n t l y, some 80 thousand Russian troops are stationed
in Chechnya, of which nearly half are detachments of the Ar-
med Fo rces of the Russian Federation (Musa Muradov, Ogra-
nichennyi izbytochnyi kontingent, Ko m m e r s a n t, 3 Marc h
2003). For more information on the composition of the Rus-
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from the Caucasus who stay in Russia permanently or se-
asonally, but this number certainly reaches several million.
According to different sources, approx. 100 thousand Che-
chens probably live in the Russian capital alone.
4 0 This term was made popular by the media in Russia in mid
1990s. ÒPersons of Caucasian nationalityÓ refers to all inhabi-
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